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Abstract
Since the year 2000, the annual trading agent competition has provided a forum
for designers to evaluate programmed trading techniques in a challenging market
scenario in competition with other design groups. After three years of apparent
progress, we attempt to evaluate the trading competence of competition partici-
pants, in the 2002 tournament and over time. Although absolute measure of in-
dividual performance is difficult to assess, relative measures, and measures of the
market performance overall are more amenable to direct analysis. We quantify
the effectiveness of the TAC travel market in terms of allocative efficiency, finding
improvement within and between tournaments. By comparison with alternative
allocation benchmarks, we can calibrate this efficiency, and identify opportunities
for further gain from trade.
1 Introduction
One of the primary motivations for producing the original Trading Agent Competi-
tion (TAC) was to spur research on a common problem, thus enabling researchers to
compare techniques and build on each others’ ideas [Wellman and Wurman, 1999].
Working on a shared problem coordinates attention on particular issues (among the
many of interest in the trading domain), and facilitates communication of methods and
results by fixing a set of assumptions and other environment settings. An inspiring
example for the TAC developers was the 1990 Santa Fe Double Auction Tournament
 This is a revised and extended version of a paper appearing in the IJCAI’03 workshop on Trading Agent
Design and Analysis (TADA).
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[Rust et al., 1993], which produced many valuable insights about the ContinuousDou-
ble Auction (CDA) mechanism, and strategies for bidding in CDAs. Even though the
CDA had been well studied before, the focused effort and attention catalyzed by the
competition led to substantial cross-fertilization of ideas and perspectives. The book
generated from that event [Friedman and Rust, 1993] remains a seminal reference for
CDAs.
A multi-year event like TAC offers the further prospect of learning from shared
experience. A goal of repeating the competition was to observe the progress of trading
agents, in effect accelerating the evolution of an adapted population of traders. Now
that we have three years of experience in the TAC series, it is appropriate to examine
whether this objective has been fulfilled. Moreover, given all the effort devoted to TAC
participation, it is incumbent on us to exploit the TAC data for what they are worth, and
see what conclusions we might draw about the efficacy of trading agents and particular
ideas about trading strategy.
By one measure, TAC has certainly succeeded in spurring research. Over a dozen
publications reporting on the competitions, specific agents, techniques employed, and
analyses have appeared to date in archival journals, refereed conferences, and maga-
zines.1 The TAC “literature” thus represents an uncommonly rich corpus of documen-
tation on trading strategy and behavior for a particular complex environment. Many of
the accounts include specific analyses or experiments involving agents from multiple
developers, or variants on a particular agent inspired by techniques reportedly em-
ployed by others [Greenwald, 2003b, Stone et al., 2002, Wellman et al., 2002]. Such
efforts augment the anecdotal evidence from entrants that each successive year the
lessons and approaches presented previously are incorporated in new and improved
agent designs.
In this paper, we present some data bearing on the assessment of performance and
progress of trading agents, as reflected in the TAC series to date. We employ data from
the actual TAC tournaments, as well as some post-competition experimentation. Our
analysis is based almost entirely on outcomes (profits and allocations), with very little
direct accounting for specific agent techniques. Thoughwe offer some conclusions, our
investigation also raises further questions. A definitive assessment of agent competence
must await further studies, perhaps based on succeeding years of TAC experience.
2 TAC Classic Game
[Note to editors: This section might best be presented as a sidebar.]
The “classic” TAC game2 presents a travel-shopping task, where traders assemble
flights, hotels, and entertainment into trips for a set of eight probabilistically generated
clients. Clients are described by their preferred arrival and departure days (  and
  ), the premium (hp) they are willing to pay to stay at the “Towers” (T) hotel rather
than “Shanties” (S), and their respective values ( 
 
  

  

) for three different types of
entertainment events. The agents’ objective is to maximize the value of trips for their
1http://auction2.eecs.umich.edu/researchreport.html
2So called to distinguish the original TAC market game from newer variants, such as the supply chain
game introduced for TAC-03 [Sadeh et al., 2003].
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clients, net of expenditures in the markets for travel goods. The three categories of
goods are exchanged through distinct market mechanisms.
Flights. A feasible trip includes air transportation bothways, comprising an inflight
day  and outflight day ,          . Flights in and out each day are sold
independently, at prices determined by a stochastic process. The initial price for each
flight is    , and follows a random walk thereafter with an increasingly
upward bias.
Hotels. Feasible trips must also include a room in one of the two hotels for each
night of the client’s stay. There are 16 rooms available in each hotel each night, and
these are sold through ascending 16th-price auctions. Agents submit bids for vari-
ous quantities, specifying the price offered for each additional unit. When the auction
closes, the units are allocated to the 16 highest offers, with all bidders paying the price
of the lowest winning offer. Each minute, the hotel auctions issue quotes, indicating the
16th- (ASK) and 17th-highest (BID) prices among the currently active unit offers [Wur-
man et al., 1998]. Starting at minute four, one of the hotel auctions is selected at random
to close, with the others remaining active and open for bids.
Hotel bidders are also subject to a “beat-the-quote” rule [Wurman et al., 2001],
requiring that any new bid offer to purchase at least one unit at a price of ASK , and
at least as many units at ASK   as the agent was previously winning at ASK.
Entertainment. Agents receive an initial random allocation of entertainment tickets
(indexed by type and day), which they may allocate to their own clients or sell to other
agents through continuous double auctions [Friedman and Rust, 1993]. The entertain-
ment auctions issue BID and ASK quotes representing the highest outstanding buy and
lowest sell offer, respectively, and remain open for buying and selling throughout the
12-minute game duration. A client may sell tickets that it does not own, but must pay
a penalty of 200 per ticket for any “short sales” not covered by the end of the game.
A feasible client trip  is defined by an inflight day in
 
, outflight day out
 
, hotel
type (
 
, which is 1 if T and 0 if S), and entertainment types (
 
, a subset of    ).
The value of this trip is given by
		
     	   in
 
    out
 

  hp 
 

 
 
 
 


 (1)
At the end of a game instance, the TAC server calculates the optimal allocation of
trips to clients for each agent, given final holdings of flights, hotels, and entertainment.
The agent’s game score is its total client trip utility, minus net expenditures in the TAC
auctions.
3 TAC-02 Tournament Results
Average scores for the sixteen agents that played in the final and semifinal rounds are
posted in Table 1. The third column represents an adjustment to final-round scores
to correct for favorability of client preference assignments, calculated according to
the formula we developed for TAC-01 [Wellman et al., 2003a]. See http://www.
sics.se/tac for a list of participant affiliations and team leaders, as well as results
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from preliminary rounds. Complete game logs are available, as they are for the previous
TAC events. Brief agent descriptions have been collected by Greenwald [2003a].
Agent Affiliation Scores
Semifinals Finals Adj Finals
ATTac AT&T Research (et al.) H1: 3137 — —
cuhk Chinese U Hong Kong H2: 3266 3069 3045
kavayaH Oracle India H1: 3200 3099 3039
livingagents3 Living Systems AG H1: 3310 3181 3161
PackaTAC N Carolina State U H2: 3250 — —
PainInNEC NEC Research (et al.) H1: 2193 — —
RoxyBot Brown U H2: 3160 — —
sics Swedish Inst Comp Sci H2: 3146 — —
SouthamptonTAC U Southampton H1: 3397 3385 3337
Thalis U Essex H2: 3199 3246 3210
tniTac Poli Bucharest H1: 3108 — —
TOMAhack U Toronto H2: 2843 — —
tvad Technion H1: 2724 — —
UMBCTAC U Maryland Baltimore Cty H1: 3208 3236 3291
Walverine U Michigan H2: 3287 3210 3277
whitebear Cornell U H2: 3324 3413 3479
Table 1: TAC-02 seeded agents, and their average scores during the semifinals (14
games) and finals (32 games).
Although we agree with those who have cautioned against focusing excessively on
ranked results in the context of research competitions [Stone, 2002], tournament results
provide an important source of information about agent quality. Agents are presumed
to act to maximize expected score, and so all else equal, an increase in score reflects an
improved agent. If several agents improve, however, this may or may not lead to higher
total scores for those agents. Whereas some kinds of improvement unambiguously in-
crease total agent surplus (e.g., fewer wasted flights, better allocation of entertainment),
others may reduce the value retained by agents (e.g., smarter agents may be more ef-
fective at competing away the consumer surplus) or even the total system surplus (e.g.,
deadweight loss due to strategic behavior).
One way to measure progress over time is to track benchmark levels of performance
by keeping some agents constant. For example, in the CADE ATP (automated theorem
proving) series of competitions [Sutcliffe, 2001], the best systems from a given year
typically enter unchanged in the next year’s event (along with improved versions, of
course). This provides a direct measure, in comparable terms, of the relative perfor-
mance across years. In a game setting, where other agents are part of the environment,
it is not strictly fair to judge an agent with respect to a different field. Nevertheless, it
3The score of livingagents was adversely affected bymissing two games. Discounting these would have
led to an average score of 3393.
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can be quite instructive to observe the implications of such transplants.
The 2001 tournament [Wellman et al., 2003a] included two calibrating agents in the
seeding round. ATTac-2000 [Stone et al., 2001] represented the highest-scoring agent
from the TAC-00 finals. To account for the rule changes between TAC-00 and TAC-
01, ATTac-2000 was modified with a one-line edit causing it to place all of its bids
before the first hotel closure as opposed to during the last minute of the game. We also
included dummy buyer, the agent provided by the Michigan TAC team in 2001 to play
in test games that do not have a full slate of agents. Whereas most of the other agents’
behaviors were modified between (and during) the qualifying and seeding round, the
dummy was left unchanged. Not surprisingly, we observed substantial deterioration in
the dummy’s standing as the preliminary rounds progressed.
The 2002 tournament did not explicitly insert calibrating agents, but the fact that
twelve of the participating teams from 2001 also entered agents in TAC-02 provides
some natural calibration. In particular, the two top-scoring agents in TAC-01, living-
agents [Fritschi and Dorer, 2002] and ATTac-2001, participated with essentially un-
changed agents in TAC-02. As shown in the table, livingagents did quite well, assum-
ing we ignore the bug that caused it to skip two games. ATTac was top scorer in the
TAC-02 seeding rounds, but then was eliminated in the semifinals. One possible ex-
planation is simply that the agent experienced technical difficulties due to a change of
computational environments between the seeding and semifinal rounds.4 Anothermore
substantive possibility is that prices during the preliminary rounds in 2002 (which AT-
Tac uses as training data) were not sufficiently representative of the final rounds. We
suspect that the decrease in relative performance also reflects a general increase in
competence of the other agents in the field. Interestingly, it may well be that because
livingagents in some respects benefits by playing along with effective and adaptive
agents [Wellman et al., 2003a], it may be more robust with respect to improvements in
the rest of the field.
The two top-scoring agents in TAC-02,whitebear andSouthamptonTAC [He and
Jennings, 2002], also contended in TAC-01. These agents reportedly evolved from their
2001 designs, improved through adopting refined classifications of game environments
[He and Jennings, 2003], and through extensive experimentation and parameter tuning
[Vetsikas and Selman, 2003].
Of the eight other repeat entries:
 Three represent complete reimplementations of the corresponding TAC-01 en-
tries, by essentially different agent designers (Thalis, sics, UMBCTAC).
 Two represent significant redesigns by the same essential designers (RoxyBot,
cuhk).
 Three represent incremental or unknown changes by the same or related design-
ers (PainInNEC, BigRed, harami).
4Peter Stone, personal communication.
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4 TACMarket Efficiency
Another gauge of agent effectiveness is how well they allocate travel goods, in the ag-
gregate, through theirmarket interactions. This is an indirectmeasure, at best, since the
objective of each agent is to maximize its own surplus, not that of the overall system—
comprising all agents plus the TAC seller. Nevertheless, such a social welfare analysis
can provide a benchmark, and shed light on the allocation of resources through an
economy of interacting software agents.
4.1 Market Efficiency in the TAC-02 Tournament
We can measure aggregate effectiveness by comparing actual TAC market allocations
with ideal global allocations, calculated centrally assuming knowledge of all client
preference information. Consider the total group of 64 clients, and the set of available
resources: 16 hotel rooms of each type per day, plus 8 entertainment tickets of each
type per day. The global optimizer calculates the allocation of resources maximizing
total client utility, net of expenditures on flights assuming they are available at their
initial prices. We take initial prices to be the relevant inherent cost (exogenously deter-
mined, independent of TAC agent demand) of flights, treating the expected stochastic
increase of flights during the game as a cost of decision delay that would be avoided
by the idealized optimizer. Note that the global optimization completely neglects ho-
tel and entertainment prices, as these are endogenous to the TAC market. Monetary
transfers affect the distribution of surplus across TAC buyers and sellers, but not the
total amount. We formulate the optimization problem as an integer linear program, and
solve it using CPLEX.
The average idealized net utility, per client, in the various rounds of the TAC tour-
nament as determined by global optimization is reported under the heading “Global”
in Table 2. Average net utility achieved in the actual TAC games (also neglecting hotel
and entertainment expenditures, but counting actual payments for flights) is reported
under “TAC Market”.
Round Games Global TAC Market TAC (%)
Qualify 390 618 415 67.0
Seeding 1045 618 470 75.7
Semi-Final 28 608 534 87.7
Final 32 609 542 89.1
Table 2: The efficiency of the TAC market compared to the global optimum.
As seen in the table, we found that the TAC market achieved 89% of the optimal
value, on average, over the 32 games of the TAC-02 finals. There was a steady improve-
ment from the qualifying round (67% optimal), seeding round (76%), and semifinals
(88%). All of these differences are significant (  
 ), except the small increment
from semifinals to finals.5
5Henceforth, all assertions of statistical significance are with respect to the 0.01 level, unless otherwise
6
It is difficult to assess this effectiveness in absolute terms, so we provide a couple
of benchmarks for comparison.
1. Uniform hotel and entertainment. We distribute the hotel rooms and entertain-
ment evenly across the eight agents, then optimize each agent’s allocation to
clients. This approach yields 95.2% of the globally optimal value on average.
(Allocation values were significantly better than the market in every round.)
2. Uniform hotel, endowed entertainment. The relative average value drops to
85.4% if we distribute only the hotels, leaving agents with their original en-
dowment of entertainment. (This value represents a significant improvement to
the market in qualifying and seeding rounds, with the market significantly better
in the finals.)
It is perhaps surprising that simply dividing the goods uniformly achieves such a
high fraction of the available surplus—better than the market if entertainment is in-
cluded in the distribution. One reason that the uniform distribution is relatively so
effective is that the agents are ex ante symmetric, with independent and identically dis-
tributed clients. Potential gains from trade are thus not so great for hotels. Second, a
direct allocation avoids the significant obstacles posed to agents pursuing their allot-
ments individually through the market. Agents face substantial risk (price uncertainty,
exposure due to complementarities, unknown hotel closing patterns), and this neces-
sarily entails some loss in expected allocation quality. For example, the set of available
hotels is sufficient to obtain trips for all clients (albeit shortened from desired lengths),
and given a definite allocation the agent can optimize for its clients accordingly. With
uncertainty, the agents may plan for longer trips than are jointly feasible, and thus
wind up wasting flights, hoarding hotel rooms (to hedge), or resorting to suboptimal
fallback trip options. A preliminary analysis indicates that this uncertainty is indeed
a significant cause of misallocation in TAC play. Developing a precise quantititative
characterization of the sources of loss is a subject for future work.
4.2 Comparisons
Given that agent programmers are actively debugging and developing their agents dur-
ing the preliminary rounds, it seems fair to assume that agent competence improves in
succeeding rounds of the tournament. The selection of best performers for the semi-
finals and then the finals naturally amplifies this effect. Thus, the progressive improve-
ment in market efficiency observed in Table 2 coincides with individual agent progress.
We performed the same global optimization analysis for the TAC-01 finals (24 games),
and found a market efficiency of 85.7%. Though better than the TAC-02 qualifying
and seeding rounds, the TAC-01 finalists did not allocate resources as well as TAC-02
finalists (  
), or even the TAC-02 semi-finalists (  
). This indirectly
(to the extent that overall market efficiency aligns with individual agent success) con-
firms our conjecture that the 2002 agents were on the whole more competent than their
predecessors.
specified.
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It is also potentially interesting to compare market effectiveness across different
configurations of agents. Our initial explorations employ versions of Michigan’s TAC-
02 entry, Walverine [Cheng et al., 2003]. In 173 games with Walverine playing all
eight agent slots, the market achieved 88.5% efficiency, a result not statistically distin-
guishable from that of the actual pool of TAC-02 finalists.
Of course, Walverine, like the others, aims to promote its own profit, not overall
efficiency per se. We discuss the general tradeoff between individual and social welfare
in Section 5 below, including an experiment based on variations ofWalverine.
In further work, we intend to evaluate additional agent configurations, including
further Walverine variants as well as agents developed by other groups.6 One inter-
esting question (at least as another benchmark) is what level of overall efficiency can
be attained by agents actually designed with this objective in mind. It should be pos-
sible to achieve at least the level of our uniform-hotel-and-entertainment benchmark
(95.2%), since it is straightforward to construct bidding policies that implement a uni-
form distribution of all goods.
4.3 Entertainment Trading Efficiency
One component of market effectiveness amenable to separate analysis is entertainment
trading. Entertainment goods are initiallydistributed as endowments to the agents, who
exchange among themselves through CDAs to reach a final allocation. Although the
value of entertainment to agents depends on their choice of trip dates, it is possible to
characterize with reasonable accuracy the gains from trade specifically attributable to
the entertainment component of the TAC market.
To measure entertainment trading efficiency, we simply compare the aggregate “fun
bonus” component of trip utility in the globally optimal allocation, with that attained in
the actual TAC market. Efficiency percentages for the various game sets are presented
in Table 3, which also repeats the overall efficiency numbers for convenient reference.
One interesting result is that the entertainment performance in the TAC-02 finals
was virtually the same as in the TAC-01 finals, despite the significant improvement
in market performance overall. This suggests that the strategic progress was focused
on hotel and flight strategies, which certainly agrees with the entrants’ reports of their
concentrations of effort.
The data on entertainment performance can also help to calibrate estimates of po-
tential gains from agent improvements. We reported above on two benchmarks based
on uniform hotel distributions, one with no entertainment trading and one with uniform
entertainment allocation. These define a potential gain from trading to uniformity of
approximately 60.5 per client (484 per agent) given the fixed uniform allocation of ho-
tels. In our process of trainingWalverine’s entertainment strategy [Cheng et al., 2003],
we observed a difference of roughly 478 on average between a policy of not trading
entertainment (average fun bonus 1019), and that of a representative hand-coded strat-
egy (that of livingagents, average fun bonus 1497). In contrast, the average fun bonus
6Performing our analysis requires only data describing client preferences and final allocations. We wel-
come any game logs other researchers would be willing to submit for our efficiency analysis, coveringwhat-
ever profiles of their own agent (and variants) they may have investigated. We also invite participation in
further experiments involving mixtures of agents from multiple groups.
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Round Games TAC (%) Entertainment (%)
02 Qualify 390 67.0 71.1
02 Seeding 1045 75.7 79.0
02 Semi-Final 28 87.7 83.0
02 Final 32 89.1 85.3
01 Final 24 85.7 85.5
allWalverine 173 88.5 85.4
non-shadingWalverine 55 89.4 85.1
shading equilibrium 470 89.2 85.6
Table 3: The efficiency of the TAC market compared to the global optimum—overall
and specifically with respect to entertainment.
in the global optimal allocation runs around 1677. The fact that the observed gain from
trade in training7 approaches the gain from uniform entertainment distribution in the
uniform-hotel case suggests that the remaining benefit from entertainment trading is
equal to the difference between uniform and optimal. We evaluated this by calculating
a third benchmark, based on global optimization of entertainment subject to a uniform
allocation of hotels to agents. The result is 92.7 per agent greater than the value with
uniform entertainment allocation. Although all of these measurements are conditioned
on the uniform hotel allocations, we believe that the relative entertainment values are
likely to be robust to any reasonable fixed hotel allocation.
5 Individual versus Social Welfare
As emphasized above, measuring market efficiency is not at all the same thing as mea-
suring the effectiveness of individual agents. Some factors in agent competence, such
as choosing optimal trips and avoiding wasted flights and hotels, correspond directly to
improvements in overall efficiency. Other factors, such as reducing demand for hotels
so as to capture a larger fraction of surplus from sellers, will tend to reward the individ-
ual agent at the expense of social welfare. Understanding the extent that this tradeoff
operates in the TAC game will shed light on the relationship between market efficiency
measures and the assessment of agent performance.
We can study this question by identifying particular strategy components that would
be expected to detract from overall welfare, and measuring the welfare loss between the
socially and individuallyoptimal policies. We consider behavior individuallyoptimal if
it is part of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) for the game. Although deriving BNE for
TAC is not remotely tractable, we have found that it is feasible to characterize restricted
TAC BNE with respect to highly constrained subsets of allowable strategies.
Specifically, we investigate the strategic behavior of hotel bid shading, where the
7The fun bonus realized in the TAC-02 finals turned out to be somewhat lower than expected based on
training observations, for both Walverine and livingagents, and apparently the rest of the field as well
except for whitebear [Cheng et al., 2003].
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agent offers to buy rooms at prices lower than its marginal values for the units.Walver-
ine determines bid prices as part of a decision-theoretic optimization of expected sur-
plus, which takes into account the probability of not obtaining a good even though its
price is below the agent’s valuation [Cheng et al., 2003].8 Though it benefits the in-
dividual agent by design, such shading runs counter to the goal of market efficiency,
as the market does not generally have available faithful signals of the relative value of
goods to the various agents.9
To evaluate this effect, we defined a variant “non-shading” strategy implemented by
Walverine with its optimal bidding procedure (i.e., shading) turned off. Agents in this
version bid their true marginal values for every hotel room. Our hypothesis was that
this would improve social welfare, but sacrifice individual profits. We in fact found,
in a trial of 55 games with all non-shading Walverines, the market achieved 89.4%
efficiency which is better (  
) than allWalverines. The actual effect of varying
strategy, however, will in general depend on the strategies of other agents. Therefore,
we employed an evolutionary search approach to find a restricted BNE for this game
[Wellman et al., 2003b].
We begin by running a series of TAC games, distributed over each of the nine pos-
sible profiles of shading and non-shading agents. Averaging the scores for each profile
(adjusted for client preference favorability) yields an expected payoff for each strategy
in each profile. We can then calculate a BNE for the restricted game using any avail-
able technique. Applying replicator dynamics [Taylor and Jonker, 1978], 10 we identify
a symmetric mixed strategy BNE where agents shade with probability 0.11, and refrain
from shading with probability 0.89. Note that this result applies specifically to the ver-
sion of shading employed in Walverine, alternative shading policies incorporated in
other agent strategies may produce varying outcomes.
The predominance of truthful bidding in equilibrium demonstrates that this policy
has advantages in a population with substantial shaders. It is not dominant, however,
which means that as the population approaches all non-shaders, there is benefit to shad-
ing. In equilibrium, the payoffs to shading and non-shading agents are the same, each a
best response to the given mixture. The average client-adjusted payoffs for all shading,
all non-shading, and the BNE mixed strategy are 3339, 3155, and 3209, respectively.
The correspondingmarket efficiencies are 88.5%, 89.4%, and 89.2%. Playing the equi-
librium strategy results in an average payoff gain of 53 per agent per game but a loss
of 46 in social welfare compared to all non-shaders.
8We refer to this as “optimal bidding”, although the optimization embodies several simplifying assump-
tions. In fact we suspect that there is much room for improvement, and are actively working on this compo-
nent for future versions ofWalverine.
9If all agents shaded proportionally, then the relative offer prices would still provide the relevant infor-
mation to the market. In general, however, the price reductions do not cancel out in this way, as the bidder’s
optimization includes many agent-specific contextual factors.
10Gambit was unable to find a symmetric BNE after some hours of cpu time, finding only the asymmetric
equilibrium in which five agents shade and three do not.
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6 Comment
The foregoing analysis provides some evidence for competence and progress in TAC
traders. Since our measures are all indirect (e.g., measuring market efficiency rather
than absolute agent performance), however, definitive conclusions are not justified.
More compelling demonstrations of progress and competence might be based on fur-
ther calibration studies, systematic search in strategy spaces, and attribution of allo-
cation suboptimality among its many possible causes (e.g., agent suboptimality, and
inherent risk—including the cost of its rational management). Further benchmarks,
capturing less ideal conditions, may prove useful in this regard.
Another natural question not at all addressed by this work is how well TAC agents
fare compared to what human traders could do? We are aware of no evidence that
humans would be particularly adept at a TAC-like trading task. One of the few studies
comparing human and computer traders (in an abstract CDA scenario) did not reflect
very favorably on the humans [Das et al., 2001].
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